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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

I.

Claimant/Appellant, Dallas Clark ("Claimant"), is represented by Paul Curtis of
Idaho

Falls,

Idaho.

("Defendant/Employer"),

Respondents/Defendants,
Liberty

and

Shari's

Northwest

Management Corporation
Insurance

Corporation

("Defendant/Surety"), are represented by Roger L. Brown of Boise, Idaho.
Industrial Commission Referee LaDawn Marsters ("Referee") issued Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendations dated March 7, 2012. A.R., p. 22-42.
By Order dated March 13, 2012, the Commission proper unanimously approved,
confirmed and adopted the Referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law ("Decision")
as its own.

A.R., p. 43-44.

The Commission received Claimant's Request for

Reconsideration and Rehearing filed April 2, 2012. A.R., p. 45-80. Defendants filed a
Response to Claimant's Request for Reconsideration and Rehearing on April 16, 2012.
A.R., p. 81-85. On April 26, 2012, Claimant filed her Reply to Defendants' Response.
A.R., p. 86-92. An Order Denying Reconsideration and Rehearing ("Order"), was entered

by the Industrial Commission on August 28, 2012.

A.R., p. 93-114.

Claimant filed her

Notice of Appeal on October 4, 2012.

II.

Course of Proceedings Below
Claimant filed a \IVorker's Compensation Complaint and an Amended Worker's

Compensation Complaint on November 23, 2009, asserting entitlement to medical
benefits, temporary total disability benefits, permanent partial impairment and/or disability
benefits, retraining and attorney fees.

AR., p. 1-8.

Defendants filed an Answer to

Complaint on December 11, 2009, denying that the accident alleged by Claimant actually
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occurred on or about the time claimed, and denying that the condition for which Claimant
sought benefits was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of Claimant's
employment. A.R., p. 9-10.

The Referee conducted a hearing June 1, 2011, in Idaho

Falls, Idaho, on the following issues:

A.

Whether Claimant sustained an injury from an accident arising out of and in
the course of her employment;

B.

Whether Claimant's condition was due in whole or in part to a pre-existing
and/or subsequent injury or condition;

C.

Whether and to what extent Claimant was entitled to medical care; and

D.

Whether Claimant was entitled to attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code
Section 72-804.

A.R., p. 22-23. One post-hearing deposition was undertaken by Claimant. AR., p. 24.

Claimant then submitted her Opening Brief and Defendants filed their Brief in Response.
Claimant chose to submit a reply, and thereafter the Referee took the matter under
advisement. A.R., p. 22.

Upon the record introduced at hearing, post-hearing deposition

testimony, and briefing submitted by the parties, the Referee issued her Decision, dated
March 7, 2012. A.R., p. 22-42.

By Order dated March 13, 2012, the Commission proper

unanimously approved, confirmed and adopted the Referee's Decision as its own. A.R.,
p. 43-44. Both the Referee and the Commission specifically found that, as a matter of fact,

Claimant had failed to prove that her low back condition was caused by an accident arising
out of and in the course of her employment. All other issues were rendered moot. AR., p.
41, 43-44.
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Claimant filed a Request for Reconsideration/ Rehearing ("Request") with the
Commission. AR., p. 45-80. Defendants objected to Claimant's Request on the grounds
that Claimant complained of no legal error, nor did Claimant present new legal or factual
information.

Claimant's

Request

was

based

solely

upon

Claimant's factual

disagreements with the Commission's findings, and as such, the Request was nothing
more than an attempt to reweigh the evidence. AR., p. 84.

Following review of the

record on reconsideration, the Commission confirmed that the substantial and competent
evidence supported its conclusion that Claimant failed to prove the occurrence of an
industrial accident. AR. 93-114. This appeal followed.
Ill.

Statement of Facts
Claimant alleged that she sustained a low back injury as a result of an industrial

accident on November 24, 2008.

She first sought treatment for back and leg pain from a

chiropractor on December 11, 2008.

D.E. M, p. 86.

Claimant was next seen on

December 16, 2008, by Dr. Brower at Community Care Clinic complaining of "onset 11/27
pain down (L) leg. Went to chiropractor-now is worse x 3 wks," and" 1 Yz weeks ago L leg
pain (most L thigh) no trauma hx." Claimant was diagnosed with sciatica. D.E. C, p. 8

(emphasis added). On December 19, 2008, Claimant presented again to Dr. Brower for
re-check for sciatica. Claimant was noted to state the pain was worse in the left buttock.
Dr. Brower referred Claimant to the Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center Emergency
Department for follow-up of leg and back pain where she was examined by Dr. Matthew
Griggs. Id., p. 7; D.E. D, p. 10. Dr. Griggs noted that Claimant's chief complaint was
moderate back pain in the left gluteus radiating to the left knee, with onset several days
ago. D.E. D, p. 10 (emphasis added).

Radiological studies of the lumbosacral spine
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were ordered and found to be negative.

Id., p. 11.

Claimant was diagnosed with a

lumbar strain, given medication, and discharged home with instructions to follow up in
one week.

Claimant next saw Dr. Jeff Thompson at Community Care Clinic on

December 24, 2008, who referred her to Dr. Gary Walker. Id., p. 9-11. There is no
mention in the records that Claimant's pain began after a workplace accident.

Claimant was seen by Dr. Walker on December 29, 2008. The chart note for this
initial visit with Dr. Walker indicates the following:
[Claimant's] history dates back to early November. She did not recall any
particular injury but noted the onset of left lower extremity pain
associated with work. It became sharper over time and has continued to
worsen.
D.E. E, p. 19 (emphasis added).

Dr. Walker ordered an MRI which showed a left

paracentral disc extrusion at L5-S1 impacting the S1 nerve root. Claimant received
epidural steroid injections from Dr. Walker on December 30, 2008, and January 29,
2009, from which she received good, albeit temporary, relief.

Physical therapy was

prescribed by Dr. Walker, however Claimant declined to attend.
Claimant presented to Dr. Walker reporting increasing pain.
again urged Claimant to attend physical therapy.

On March 9, 2009,

At this visit, Dr. Walker

Claimant received an additional

injection three days later on March 12, 2009. Id., p. 20-24.
Claimant attended a physical therapy session with therapist Stephanie Liddle on
March 19, 2009. In the progress note from that visit Ms. Liddle recorded the following:
[Ciaimant] has had a four month history of pain into her left leg. She
states the pain came on suddenly, but she is unaware of any specific
injury to cause her pain. She denies any background or previous history
of low back pain and contributes [sic] this episode to being a
server/bartender for many, many years catching up to her and her
not taking care of her body.
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D.E. G, p. 41(emphasis added).

Claimant followed up with Dr. Walker on April 7, 2009, at which time he
recommended Claimant seek surgical consultation due to lack of resolution using nonoperative treatment, noting:
She is leaving town for a week but will check her insurance to see who is
a participant. She will let me know back and we will get her set up for a
surgical consultation when she returns in a week.
D.E. E, p. 24 (emphasis added). There is no indication in the medical records that

Claimant, at this time, had made a worker's compensation claim with Employer, or
intended to have her potential surgery covered by workers' compensation. A.R., p. 96.
Claimant consulted with neurosurgeon, Dr. Stephen Marano, on April 22, 2009.
Consistent with previous chart notes written by Claimant's previous medical providers,
Dr. Marano noted:
Claimant "cannot associate any injuries or trauma to the onset of her
pain. She said that it just kind of started out of the blue. She thought
maybe it was due to standing funny."
D.E. I, p. 53 (emphasis added). Pursuant to her consultation with Dr. Marano, Claimant

elected to proceed with surgical disc excision. Id., p. 54.
On April 24, 2009, a First Report of Injury ("FROI") was completed on Claimant's
behalf by Zach Dummermuth, general manager for Employer. This document was
signed by Claimant. The FR 0 I states that on November 24, 2008, Claimant noticed
an ache in her low back while she was "standing" and "making salad." In describing
the specific sequence of events of how the injury occurred, the report states,
"standing there and back began hurting." The report cites December 15, 2008, as
the date Employer was notified of the alleged accident. D.E. A, p. 1-2.
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Surety received the FROI on April 28,

2009. Pursuant to Surety's internal

investigative procedure, claim manager, Bradley Armstrong conducted a telephone
interview with Claimant on May 6, 2009. Mr. Armstrong asked Claimant to describe
what happened on November 24, 2008:
Mr. Armstrong: Now I have a date of injury of 11/24/2008. Was there a
specific accident that happened that day or were you just kind of, was
that when you started to feel the pain in your back?
Claimant: Um, I was at work and my manager Michelle Miller [sic,
Morgan] . . . and I were standing there [by] the salad bar [and] . . . I
noticed a pain and so I thought that it was because I was standing on
it wrong, put all my weight on it wrong, and so we were kind of joking
around about my weight. [ ... ] Then later on that evening . . . I was
bringing silverware out from the kitchen and I went to put it up in the
water station number two and [when] I went to put that up there it just
like a sharp pain in the same area and I drop ... dropped and so I
just laid it there set it down on the counter where I was . . . and just
set my tables from there ... I didn't try to put the container up there I set
all my tables from there and then went to the tray that was just about
empty I just set it upon the top ...

D.E. P, p. 207-208 (emphasis added).

Claimant went on to explain what prompted her

to seek medical treatment:
Claimant: Michelle was my supervisor and I went to bend over to get
the scheduling book and I couldn't bend over because of the pain
and that's when she told me I needed to go to the doctor.
Mr. Armstrong:
correct?

And that was in the first part of December, is that

Claimant: Yes.
Mr. Armstrong:
time?

And you went over to Community Care your first

Claimant: Yes.

Id., p. 208 (emphasis added).

During the interview Claimant did not mention

any witnesses other than Michelle Morgan. After reviewing available medical records,
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Mr. Armstrong sent Claimant a letter dated May 19, 2009, informing her that her claim
was denied because there was no accident associated with the claim. D.E. B, p. 5.
Notwithstanding the denial of her claim,
procedures

recommended

by

Dr.

Claimant proceeded with the surgical

Mar an o,

inc I u ding

disc

excision,

decompressive foraminotomy, and annular repair at L5-S I. O.E. J, p. 54. Claimant
has since experienced complications from that surgery and a recurrent disc herniation
at L5-SI. O.E. I, p. 57-63.
On November 23, 2009, approximately six months after her claim was denied by
the Surety, Claimant filed a workers' compensation complaint with the Industrial
Commission. A.R., p. 1-8. Defendants answered the complaint and discovery ensued.
By the time of her deposition on April 13, 2011, Claimant's account of her industrial
accident had changed substantially. Asked by defense counsel how exactly the accident
occurred, Claimant testified:
I had been doing the salad bar reach-ins, which is down underneath our
cabinets. And there was a pain, but I didn't think it was more than a pain
of just bending and stretching.
And then later on that night, probably around 1:30, 2:00 in the
morning - it was when I was working graveyard - I was carrying a
tray of silverware - a full tray of silverware out to put it into the water
station.
And as I was coming out of the water station to lift it above to where
the shelf is, which is above the water spout -so it was just about a little
higher than my shoulders - I just felt a sharp pain. And I dropped the
tray, and I fell.
And Aaron, he came out. 1 The cook came out - running out
and helped me up. And he was like, "What's going on?" And I told him
that something happened. "Something is vvrong with my back." And he
told me -he helped me up to the booth and told me just to sit still for
a little bit and that he was going to try to call Michelle. And then he picked
up the silverware for me off the floor and told me just to stay there.

1

In Claimant's statement to Bradley Armstrong on May 6, 2009, Claimant identified Michelle Morgan as a
witness. Claimant failed, however, to mention the cook, Aaron Swenson. O.E. P, p. 207.
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Claimant's Deposition, p. 35-36 (emphasis added). Defense counsel then asked Claimant

to describe the silverware incident in more detail:
Defense Counsel: When you were carrying [the silverware tray] about
how high was it ... according to your body ... ?
Claimant: I was trying to carry it because they told me - the doctor I
went to at the Community Care, 2 he said to try to always keep my
shoulders center with my knees, you know, not to try to bend outside
of that area. And so I tried - I always would carry - I would carry it
towards my body.
Defense Counsel: Now, you said that you dropped the tray and you
fell; is that correct?
Claimant: Yes. Well, actually, when I went to put it up there, it felt like
somebody had taken, like, an ice pick and hurt my back. And so
when I went to put it up there and it felt, like, the stabbing, the
silverware tray fell. And, of course, then the weight of it - i t fell,
like, towards me. So I tried to, like, stop that from falling, and then I
fell. And then I was trying to, like, stop that from coming, but it was
coming down on me.
Defense Counsel: So you literally fell to the ground?
Claimant: Yes.
Claimant Deposition, p. 43, lines 1-10, 23-25,

p. 44, lines 1-11 (emphasis added).

Contradicting her statement to Surety, 3 Claimant went on to indicate that she did not
work for the rest of her shift, stating, " [Aaron] came out and took the food orders,
and I put it into the computer. And then he brought the food out and served it for
me. Id., p. 46, lines 12-18.

2
Claimant was describing how she was carrying the tray right before the alleged accident. Yet she did
not treat for a back condition, at Community Care or otherwise, until after the alleged accident and
therefore could not yet have received her doctor's instructions on how to carry items, e.g., a tub of
silverware, Claimant Deposition p. 43, lines 4-10.
3
Claimant told Mr. Armstrong that" I just set all of my tables from there and then went to the tray that
was just about empty I just set it up on the top." D.E. P, p. 207-208 (emphasis added).
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When asked by defense counsel about reporting the incident Claimant testified:
Defense Counsel: And when did you report the accident ... ?
Claimant: That next day, it wasn't - I didn't work that day; so I came in to
talk to Michelle. She came in at 3:30.
Defense Counsel: Of the following day, the 251h?
Claimant: Yes, The following day, yes. And I came in and talked to
Michelle, and she told me to take the rest of the night off that night and
to see how I started feeling. And then it wasn't getting better; so when I
went in the next morning, she told me to go to the Community Care . . . I
went to the Community Care ... I couldn't work for two days because of
it.
Claimant's Deposition, p. 46, lines 19-25, p. 47, lines 1-9 (emphasis added). Claimant's
next account of the alleged industrial accident occurred at hearing on June 1, 2011.
Asked by her legal counsel to describe what happened, Claimant testified:
I was cleaning the reach-ins, which are the refrigerators underneath the
salad bar ... As I was standing up, I felt-I felt a dull pain into my back
as I straightened up.
I went along with my duties through the night. And it was
approximately-I want to say it was closer to 2:00 or 3:00 in the morning
rather than 1:00 or 2:00. And I was carrying out a full silverware-tub
full of silverware from the dish area, which is in the kitchen.
And as I was coming into Water Station 1 or Station 2, I went to
put the tub of silverware up on the ledge where the silverware goes. And
as I was lifting the tub up, I felt a sharp pain in the lower part of my back
that went down my leg. And it caused me to drop the silverware, and
it actually landed onto the water station itself. And then the weight
of it had dropped it to the floor.
And I caught myself as I was, like, going forward. I used the ledge
of the water station to hold myself, but I was still - I was almost to the
bottom of it, to the end of the floor.
And Aaron actually - he heard the crash and came out, and he
asked me what was [sic] what happened ... [H]e helped me to a booth ..
. .[W]e tried to call a manager ... Aaron was trying to call [Michelle] first. .
. . And so I stayed in the booth. Aaron picked up the silverware, set it
there on the water station, and told me just to sit there until I was
feeling better ... And that's what I did.
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Tr. p. 48, lines 6-7, 13-25, p. 49, lines1-10, 13-16, p. 50, lines1-13 (emphasis added).

Claimant testified that she worked "at least the next five days" because she had no other
income. Claimant then called in sick and spoke to Michelle. According to Claimant it
was during that phone call that Michelle told her to go to the doctor. Claimant stated she
went to Community Care the next day.
Claimant's co-worker Aaron Swenson ("Aaron") testified at the hearing on behalf of
Claimant. Aaron, a line cook, was the only other employee on duty when Claimant alleges
her accident occurred. Aaron described the alleged incident as follows:
I heard a big bang out in the lobby; so that's where I went. ... [She] told me
she slipped, if I remember ... I don't know if she slipped or tripped or what,
but I know she fell and hurt herself.... And I heard something, like, crash
out there, and it was Dallas with a bunch of plates, silverware, and stuff.
And she was hurting and having a hard time getting up and stuff; so I
helped her get her stuff picked up. And I helped her get to a seat.
Tr. p. 24, lines 11-16, p. 26, lines 1-10 (emphasis added). Aaron testified that he was in

the kitchen and therefore he did not see Claimant's alleged fall. Id., p. 35, lines1-8. When
asked by defense counsel if he reported the incident to management, Aaron testified:
Defense Counsel:
Did you report the accident to any management
employee of Shari's?
Aaron: Well, everybody knew about it. I think they knew about it before I
did.4
Tr. p. 36, lines 16-20. The Commission found Aaron was not a credible witness,

The case was taken under advisement by the Commission on March 6, 2012, and
after thoroughly considering the testimonial and documentary evidence in the record, as
well as the briefs of the parties, the Commission held that Claimant failed to prove the
jAaron was the only employee other than Claimant on duty at the time of the alleged accident.
Accordingly, if Claimant's alleged incident actually occurred as described by Aaron and Claimant, Aaron
must have known about it before anyone else, including management, BECAUSE HE CLAIMED HE
WAS THERE WHEN IT HAPPENED.
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occurrence of an industrial accident. Claimant's remaining issue were deemed moot. A.R.,
p. 22-44.

Claimant timely filed Claimant's Request for Reconsideration/Rehearing arguing
that the Commission's decision against Claimant

is not based upon substantial and

competent evidence because the Referee overlooked or misinterpreted key evidence,
improperly excluded other evidence and made "obvious and clear" factual errors.
Claimant requested reconsideration and/or rehearing of the case so that additional
witnesses could testify. A.R., p. 45-62.
Defendants objected to Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration on April 16, 2012,
arguing that the decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence and that
Claimant's motion effectively requests that the Commission reweigh evidence and
arguments simply because the case was not resolved in Claimant's favor. AR., p. 81-85.
Claimant filed a reply to Defendants' objection on April 26, 2012. A.R., p. 86-92.
In a 22-page order denying Claimant's request, the Commission methodically, and
in minute detail, addressed the complaints raised by Claimant in support of her motion for
reconsideration. A.R., p. 93-114.

IV.

Issues on Appeal

A.

Whether, upon the record in its entirety, there is substantial and
competent evidence to support the Commission's factual determination
that Claimant failed to prove the occurrence of an industrial accident

B.

Whether Defendants' request under I. C. §12-121 and I. A. R. 41 for an
award of attorney fees and costs on appeal should be granted

C.

Whether Claimant's request for an award of attorney fees on appeal
under l.C. §72-313 [sic] should be denied
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ARGUMENT
I.

RELEVANT LAW
Relying upon the former Idaho Code §72-17(a) (now, §72-18 (a)), this Court has

established clear requirements for a Claimant seeking benefits under Idaho's Worker's
Compensation Law. In Dinius v. Loving Care and More, Inc., 133 Idaho 572, 574 900
P.2d 738, 740 (1999), the Court stated:
The applicable standard for determining whether an employee is entitled to
compensation under the Worker's Compensation Act requires that the injury
must have been caused by an accident "arising out of and in the course of
employment."

Dinius v. Loving Care and More, Inc., 133 Idaho 572, 574, 990 P.2d 738, 740 (1999)
(quoting l.C. §72-102 (18)(a)). Claimant carries the burden of proving both that she
was injured and that "the injury was the result of an accident arising out of and in
the course of employment." Seamans v. Maaco Auto Painting and Body Works, 128

Idaho 747, 751, P.2d 1192, 1196 (1996)(emphasis added) (citing Neufield v. Browning

Farris Indus., 109 Idaho 899, 902, 712 P.2d 600, 603 (1985)).
II.

STAND ARD OF REVIEW
The Commission's decision below turns solely upon an issue previously identified

by this Court as a question of fact:

Whether Claimant proved the occurrence of an

industrial accident. The standard of review long applied by this Court in an appeal such as
this is concisely set forth in Kess/er ex rel. Kessler v. Payette County, 129 Idaho 855, 858,
934 P.2d 28, 31 (1997):
It is particularly important to note that whether an injury arose out of and
in the course of employment is a question of fact to be decided by the
Commission. Reinstein v. McGregor Land and Livestock Co., 126 Idaho
156, 879 P.2d 1089 (1994).
Although this Court may review the
Commission's factual findings, this Court must limit its review to determining
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whether the Commission correctly denied benefits after it applied the law to
the relevant facts. Morgan v. Columbia Helicopters, Inc., 118 Idaho 347, 796
P.2d 1020 ( 1990). This Court may not set aside findings of fact that are
supported by substantial competent, although conflicting, evidence
(See l.C. 72-732(1); Gradwohl v. J.R. Simplot Co., 96 Idaho 655, 534 P.2d
775 (1975)), but may disturb the Commission's findings if they are clearly
erroneous. Koester v. State Ins. Fund, 124 Idaho 205, 208, 858 P.2d 744,
747 (1993). This Court additionally may not scrutinize the weight and
credibility of the evidence relied upon by the Commission but must
construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who
prevailed before the Commission. Darner v. Southeast Idaho In-Home
Servs., 122 Idaho 897, 841 P.2d 427 (1992).

Kessler, 129 Idaho at 858, 934 P.2d at 31 (emphasis added).
the matter anew."

"[The Court] does not try

Wichterman v. J.H. Kelly, Inc., 144 Idaho 138, 158 P.3d 301, 303

(2007) (citing Hartv. Kaman Bearing & Supply, 130 Idaho, 296, 299, 939 P.2d 1375, 1378
(1997)).
On appeal from a decision of the Idaho Industrial Commission, the Supreme Court
grants great deference to the Commission's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law.
This Court exercises free review over questions of law, but not over questions of fact. As
restated in Sundquist v. Precision Steel & Gypsum, Inc., 141 Idaho 450, 111 P.3d 135
(2005):
When reviewing a decision of the Industrial Commission, this Court
exercises free review over questions of law. Uhl v. Ballard Medical
Products, Inc., 138 Idaho 653, 657, 67 P.3d 1265, 1269 (2003) ... The
factual findings of the Industrial Commission will be upheld provided
they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Uhl, 138
Idaho at 657, 67 P.3d at 1269. "Substantial and competent evidence is
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a
conclusion." Id. The conclusions reached by the Industrial Commission
regarding the credibility and weight of evidence wi!i not be disturbed unless
the conclusions are clearly erroneous. Hughen v. Highland Estates, 137
Idaho 349, 351, 48 P.3d 1238, 1240 (2002). We will not re-weigh the
evidence or consider whether we would have drawn a different conclusion
from the evidence presented.
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Id., (emphasis added). "[Substantial and competent evidence] is more than a scintilla of

proof, but less than a preponderance." Stolle v. Bennett, 144 Idaho 44, 48, P.3d 545, 549
(2007) (Internal quotations and citations omitted). The Commission is the ultimate judge of
credibility of witnesses. Duncan v. Navajo Trucking, 134 Idaho 202, 204; 998 P.2d 1115,
1117 (2000). It is a function of the Commission and not of this Court to determine the
credibility of witnesses, the weight to be assigned testimony, and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the record as a whole.

ASARCO, Inc., v. Industrial Special

Indemnity Fund, 127 Idaho 928, 931, 908 P.2d 1235, 1238 (1996).

Ill.

CONSTRUING THE EVIDENCE OF RECORD IN A LIGHT MOST
FAVORABLE TO
RESPONDENTS, THE COMMISSION'S FACTUAL
DETERMINATION BELOW THAT CLAIMANT DID NOT MEET HER BURDEN
OF PROVING THE OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT RESULTING IN
INJURY ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF HER EMPLOYMENT IS
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE
Claimant/Appellant incorrectly characterizes the holding of the Referee and the

Commission in this case as a mistake of law. Claimant's Opening Brief, p. 26.

Yet,

Claimant disingenuously contends that the Commission's decision below was not based
on substantial and competent evidence because the Referee overlooked or misinterpreted
evidence, improperly excluded other evidence , and made "obvious and clear" factual
errors. AR. p. 93.
Factual errors Claimant specifically complained of include the Referee's findings: 1)
that Claimant herself completed the FROI; 2) that the Surety did not pay some of
Claimant's related expenses; 3) that Employer \Vas not aware of Claimant's injury and
accident until late April 2009; and 4) that Claimant's accident was not recorded in the
Employer's daily log book. A. R. p. 57.
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The Commission agreed with Claimant that there were some errors in the findings
of fact. First, the FROI was not completed by Claimant, but was actually completed by
manager, Mr. Dummermuth, and signed by Claimant. The Commission stated this was
harmless error, because the basis for the decision against Claimant was that she failed to
prove that an industrial accident occurred, which would not change simply because
someone other than Claimant completed the FROI. A.R., p. 100-101.
The Commission next agreed with Claimant that Surety did pay some medical
expenses associated with Claimant's claim.

Again, the Commission found this to be

harmless error, explaining that, notwithstanding Claimant's apparent misunderstanding of
Idaho's worker's compensation law, payment of benefits by a Surety does not equate to
acceptance of liability for a claim. A.R. p. 101; see also, Idaho Code §72-201.
Claimant next argued that the FROI contained an inaccurate description of
Claimant's accident, and that it was that inaccurate information that led the Commission to
the conclusion that Claimant was not credible. Unfortunately for Claimant, however, and
as clearly articulated by the Commission,

the record is replete with many additional

reasons for the Commission to conclude that Claimant lacked credibility. The Commission
first discussed Claimant's own contradictory statements, (previously set forth above) of
how she first came to require treatment for her low back, as evidenced in the early medical
records, Ciaimant's statement to Surety on May 6, 2009, her deposition on April 13, 2011,
and her hearing testimony on June 1, 2011. Claimant's later statements were inconsistent
with those recorded in her early medical records with respect to the details surrounding her
symptom onset.

Claimant's later statements were also inconsistent with each other on
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critical points including pain onset and the circumstances under which Claimant says her
supervisor told her to see a doctor. AR. p. 101-104.
Claimant argued that her many inconsistencies and contradictions involve only
minor details, and that her various accounts of the alleged accident were substantially
similar, citing this Court's holding in Stevens-McAtee v. Potlatch, 145 Idaho 325, 179 P.
3d 288 (2008) in support of her argument. Claimant believes her later testimony, like the
claimant's testimony in McAtee, simply provides more details than her earlier statements.
However, the McAtee Court found claimant's later testimony, although more detailed
than his prior accounts, was not inconsistent with those earlier accounts. Id. While in
the present case Claimant's later testimony certainly provides more details than her earlier
accounts of the accident, in contrast with McAtee, Claimant's later testimony was also
inconsistent with, and contradictory of, her earlier versions. A.R. 101-104.

Not only

did Claimant fail to mention a work-place accident to her medical providers, she is reported
to have affirmatively stated she had no history of trauma or accident, that her low back
pain began "out of the blue" while she was "standing funny" and she thought it was from
waitressing for many years and not taking care of her body. D. E. C p. 8; D.E. E p.
19; D.E. I p. 53; D.E. Gp. 41 . (Emphasis added.)

The Commission clearly articulated three reasons for finding that the information
contained in Claimant's medical records was more credible than Claimant's later
statements and testimony:
First, the medical records from December 2008 to April 2009 are
more contemporaneous to the onset of Claimant's back pain than
statements and testimony delivered after April 2009. Second, statements
made during litigation, or even during the course of making a workers'
compensation claim, are inherently self-serving; this does not make them
per se untrue, but it does make them more suspect than statements made
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for the sole purpose of receiving appropriate medical care. Indeed, the Idaho
Rules of Evidence recognize that statements made for the purposes of
medical care have a "circumstantial [guarantee] of trustworthiness'; that is
why they are an exception to the rule that hearsay is inadmissible. Third,
Claimant's later accounts of her accident, both in her statement to
Surety and in her testimony, are so contradictory as to be unreliable.
Claimant's descriptions of the accident are not just progressively more
detailed, as in McAtee above; Claimant's descriptions actively conflict
with each other.

A.R. p. 106 (emphasis added). The Commission then clarified its process for determining
witness credibility:
We understand that memory is an imperfect device, and that the
details of an accident resulting in an injury can be forgotten or
misremembered as time passes. We understand, too, that even credible
witnesses have a desire to present themselves in the best possible light, and
may subconsciously massage certain details without a malicious intent to
deceive, Thus, when determining whether a witness is credible, we do
not look for perfect consistency. Rather, we look for substantial
consistency supported by the other evidence in the record.

Id. p. 107 (emphasis added). The Commission, in explaining why Claimant lacked
credibility, stated:
Here, Claimant's accounts are not substantially consistent. Either
she fell, or she did not fall; either she fell to the floor, or she was able to
catch herself; either she dropped the tray, or she set it down; either she set
tables after the accident, or she rested in a booth for the remainder of her
shift; either the silverware tray actually "came down on" Claimant, or it fell
without impacting her - these are not minor details, easily
misremembered; these are material facts about how the accident
occurred. A heavy silverware tray "coming down on" a fallen person could
easily cause injury, perhaps even serious injury, depending on how heavy it
was and what pa ti of the body was impacted, and it defies belief that if this
actually happened, Claimant would have neglected to mention it to
Surety.

Id (emphasis added).

The Commission, like the Referee, found it suspicious that

Claimant's description of a lifting accident, by the time of her deposition:
. . . grew to include an elaborate recitation of how she dropped the
silverware tray as she fell to the ground, creating a clamor that brought
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Aaron from the kitchen. She had not previously divulged this dramatic
fact, not to her many treating medical providers, and not in response to
direct questioning by Defendants about how she incurred her back pain.
Instead, she told Surety in May 2009 that she set the tray down.
A.R. p. 108 (emphasis added)(citing A. R. p. 39).

Noting that Claimant was not merely

providing more detail as contemplated by the holding in McAtee, the Commission found it
to be a "direct contradiction, calling into question the veracity of Claimant's

testimony as a whole" thus leading the Commission to its irrefutable conclusion:
The substantial evidence in the record does not support a conclusion that
Claimant's accident occurred as described at deposition or hearing. It does
not support a conclusion that Claimant's accident occurred as described in
her initial interview with Surety. In fact, the substantial evidence in the
record does not support a conclusion that Claimant's accident
occurred at al I.
Id., (emphasis added).

IV.

DEFENDANT/RESPONDENTS' REQUEST UNDER I. C. §12-121 and I. A. R. 41
FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL SHOULD BE
GRANTED
Claimant/Appellant has characterized the issue before this Court as one of law.

Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 26.

However, the issue here is actually one of fact, that is,

whether there was substantial, competent evidence to support the Commission's finding.
As previously articulated by this Court:
Attorney fees and costs are properly awarded when an appeal asks this
Court to do nothing more than reweigh the evidence submitted to the
Commission.
Duncan v. Navajo Trucking, 134 Idaho 202, 204; 998 P.2d 1115, 1117 (2000) (citing Baker
v. Louisiana Pacific Corporation, 123 Idaho 799, 803, 853 P.2d 544, 547 (1993).

When determining whether to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
party on appeal, the Court is guided by the following general principles:
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Since the statutory power [to award attorney fees] is discretionary, attorney
fees will not be awarded as a matter of right. Nor will attorney fees be
awarded where the losing party brought the appeal in good faith and where
a genuine issue of law was presented . . . [An award of attorney fees may
be granted under I. C. § 12-121 and I. A. R. 41 on appeal to the prevailing
party] when this court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal has been
brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.

Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 918, 591 P.2d 1078, 1085
( 1979)(emphasis added).
V.

CLAIMANT/APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
UNDER I. C. §72-313 [sic] OR OTHERWISE

Regardless of the outcome of the issue on appeal, Respondents should not be
ordered to pay attorney fees. Respondents clearly have reasonable grounds to ask the
Court to affirm the Industrial Commission's ruling that Claimant failed to meet her burden
of proving the occurrence of an industrial accident.

l.C. 72-804 fees are only payable

when the Commission, or any Court hearing a workers compensation proceeding,
determines that the employer or surety contested the claim for compensation ''without
reasonable grounds."
CONCLUSION

Claimant has not argued that the Commission misapplied the law in this case, but,
rather, simply seeks a determination from this Court substituting Claimant's view of key
facts for those found by the Commission below.

Thus, Claimant 's allegation that the

Commission failed to ground its decision upon substantial and competent evidence is little
more than a thinly veiled attempt to have this Court re-try the underlying case and reweigh evidence, hoping that the Court will agree with Claimant's version of the facts rather
than the findings and conclusions appropriately reached by the Commission below.
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As previously set forth, Defendants respectfully pray this Court apply the standard
of review announced in Kessler, 129 Idaho at 858, 934 P.2d at 31, and affirm the
Commission's decision in this matter. Further, Defendants request this Court award
reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal to Defendants/Respondents, pursuant to

l.C. §12-121 and I. AR. 41, as well as the guidelines set forth in Minich, 99 Idaho at 918,
591 P.2d at 1085.

Respectfully submitted this

11~

day of February, 2013.

LAW OFFICES OF HARMON & DAY

By:

,
RogE% L. Brown
1
Attor ey for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

!I~

day of

fchruavv , 2013, I caused a

copy of the foregoing RESPONSIVE BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENTS to be
served by first class mail, postage prepaid, upon the following:

Paul T. Curtis
Curtis & Porter, PA
598 N. Capitol
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

24 - RESPONSIVE BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS SHARI'S
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION., et al.

